Washington, Dec 08: Following are the key provisions of the US legislation to implement the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal reconciled by the House-Senate Conference Committee:
* The Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 will secure India`s --
(a) Full participation in the proliferation security initiative;
(b) Formal commitment to the statement of interdiction principles of such initiative;
(c) Public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the guidelines, procedures, criteria and control lists of the Wassaenaar arrangement;
(d) Demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and (E) ratification of or accession to the convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997.
* It will secure India`s full and active participation in the United States` efforts to dissuade, isolate and if necessary sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire
Weapons of Mass Destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
* The bill states that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should not seek to facilitate or encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other
party if such exports are terminated under United States law.
* The US will seek to halt increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.
* The US will ensure that spent fuel generated in India`s civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required under Section 131 F of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
* The US will encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
Ensure that any safeguards agreement or additional protocol to which India is party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.
* Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating requirements.
* In the binding sections, the bill asks the President to determine that India has provided the US and the IAEA with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programmes, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.
* The President shall submit to the Congress a summary of the plan provided by India to the US and the IAEA to separate India`s civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programmes, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India`s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration.
* The President will give to the Congress a
description and assessment of the specific measures that India
has taken to fully and actively participate in United States
and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if
necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to
acquire weapons capability and the capability to enrich
uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction.
* He will also provide a description of the steps
taken to ensure that proposed United States civil nuclear
cooperation with India will not in any way assist India`s
nuclear weapons programme.
-- Termination of nuclear transfers to India
* Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement
for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to Section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 USC 2153) and pursuant to
this title, and except as provided under subparagraph (b),
exports of nuclear and nuclear and nuclear-related material,
equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if there
is any materially significant transfer by an Indian person of
--
(i) Nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or
technology that is no consistent with nsg guidelines or
decisions, or
(ii) Ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or
technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines, unless
that President determines that cessation of such exports would
be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States
non proliferation objectives or otherwise jeoparadise the
common defence and security.
* The President may choose not to terminate exports of
nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and
technology of India under subparagraph (a) if -
(i) The transfer covered under such subparagraph was made
without the knowledge of the government of India.
(ii) At the time of the transfer, either the government
of India did not own, control, or direct the Indian person
that made the transfer or the Indian person that made the
transfer is a natural person who acted without the knowledge
or any entity described in subparagraph (b) or (c) of section
(110 (5); and
(iii) The President certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that the government of India has
taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other enforcement
actions against the Indian person with respect to such
transfer.
Requirements for approvals -- exports, re-exports,
and retransfers may only be approved if --
(i) The end user-
(i) Is a multinational facility participating in
an IAEA-approved programme to provide alternatives to national
fuel cycle capabilities; or
(ii) Is a facility participating in an IAEA-approved
programme to provide alternatives to national fuel cycle
capabilities; or retransfer is associated with, bilateral or
multinational programme to develop a proliferation-resistant
fuel cycle.
(ii) Approrpirate measures are in place at any
facility refereed to in clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive
nuclear technology, as defined in section 4 (5) of the nuclear
non-proliferation act of 1978 (22 u s c.3203 (5), will be
diverted to any person, site, facility, location, or programme
not under IAEA safeguards; and
(iii) The President determines that the export,
re-export, transfer, or retransfer will not assist in the
manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices or the
production of fissile material for military purposes.
Reporting to Congress -
(1) Inforamtion on nuclear activities of India --
* The President shall keep the appropriate
congressional committees fully and currently informed of the
facts and implications of any significant nuclear activities
of India, including --
-
(a) Any material non compliance on the part of the
Government of India with -
(i) The non proliferation commitments undertaken in the
joint statement of July 18,2005, between the President of the
United States and the Prime Minister of India;
(ii) The separation plan presented in the national
Parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail on
May 11, 2006;
(iii) A safeguards agreement between the government of
India and the IAEA;
(iv) An additional protocol between the government of
India and the IAEA;
(v) An agreement for cooperation between the
government of India and the United States government arranged
pursuant to Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
USC 2153)) or any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of
such act (42 USC 2160)
(vi) The terms and conditions of any approved licenses
regarding the export or re export of nuclear material or
dual-use material, equipment, or technology; and
(vii) United States laws and regulations regarding
such licenses;
Bureau Report
