Arguments Against
• The deal is likely to abet the nuclear weapon capabilities of India. For, if civil and military facilities are separated, the supply of international nuclear fuel will free its existing facilities, designated as military facilities, to produce plutonium and enriched plutonium exclusively for weapons’ purpose.
• The deal might provoke other nuclear weapon states like China to enter into the same kind of agreement with other implicit nuclear nations like Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan President Musharraf, during his recent visit to China, has argued for a Pakistan-China nuclear deal along the same lines.
• India has still not signed the NPT treaty. But it will enjoy all the privileges available to declared nuclear powers under the NPT regime. In the eyes of American non-proliferation lobby the nuclear deal is an American sellout to India.
• Arguments against the deal in India have centred around three main points. First and foremost, the proposed separation of nuclear facilities into civil and military is costly and difficult or rather impractical due to the Indian nuclear programme being unified since the very beginning. Secondly, the deal will impact India’s ability to produce requisite fissile material as all new nuclear facilities will be civilian in nature and under the supervision of IAEA. Third, nuclear power is costly in nature and an emerging county like India can ill afford it. It is a luxury that only the developed world can enjoy and India should not count on it in its energy security calculus. Last but not the least, the deal is asymmetrical in nature since it is all about American promises and Indian commitments.
• Finally, the deal does not remove the discriminatory nature of the present nuclear regime which India has been fighting all along. Why should India place all its “existing and future civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision” when other nuclear powers are not compelled to do so? In terms of statistics, out of the 915 facilities under IAEA safeguards worldwide, only 11 are in the five NPT nuclear powers. Thus, India will continue to be a part of the discriminatory non-proliferation regime.
Arguments For
• First, to answer the proliferation charge, the present deal is a win-win situation for the non-proliferation regime since it brings India into the nuclear mainstream. All the past policies to bring India into NPT regime had failed. Then why not give the deal a chance? India, despite being a declared nuclear power, has an impeccable non-proliferation record that needs to be trusted and rewarded rather than questioned and punished. As India’s Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said, “If India’s past record and current policies are not recognised, and worse still, if it is to be graded with those whose record in this respect is more than suspect, then our nonproliferation objectives may enjoy the comfort of noble intentions but not the efficacy of tactical action.”
• Second, India is a fast growing economy that is looking for all the energy resources that it can get hold of, howsoever costly they may be. True, the nuclear establishment has failed to meet its commitment of producing 2,700 megawatts of electricity from nuclear plants by 1980-81. It is roughly producing the same committed amount about thirty-five years later that constitutes three percent of India’s energy supply. The denial of nuclear fuel due to provisions of the NPT regime has been precisely the reason behind the Indian nuclear establishment’s dismal performance. History has given us the chance and we must seize it. If international nuclear fuel is available, the cost of producing electricity will also come down and will be within the affordable range.
• Third, there is nothing in the deal that asks India not to pursue its three-phase nuclear power programme. In fact, it further adds to the process. India can continue to pursue its fast-breeder reactor programme independently.
• Fourth, India will get access to all the facilities and technologies available to declared nuclear powers in the NPT regime without signing the treaty.
• Fifth, India has not given any commitment to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which even US and China have signed, though both are yet to ratify it. The only commitment that India has given is that of negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty with the US. •
• Sixth, India is not under any obligation to not produce fissile material and can continue to do so as long as it needs, to meet its declared policy of developing credible minimum nuclear deterrence.
• Seventh, there is no provision in the deal that asks India to place its indigenously developed nuclear reactors under IAEA supervision. The deal is applicable only in the case of existing and future nuclear reactors that will be using international nuclear fuel. Technically, India can build up as many indigenous nuclear reactors as it wants for its security purposes.
• Finally, to quote the Indian Prime Minister, “It will be an autonomous Indian decision as to what is ‘civilian’ and what is ‘military’. Nobody outside will tell us what is ‘civilian’ and what is ‘military’.” We have no reason to distrust the words of our Prime Minister.
On balance, the India-US nuclear deal as proposed is the much-needed recipe to regenerate our nuclear establishment that is stifling under present international regulations. If the status quo is allowed to prevail, our ambitious plan for nuclear power will not only remain a pipedream but even the status quo will become unsustainable as Indian nuclear fuel sources are limited and of inferior quality that make it more costly.
